Socio-economic factors

Introduction: The socio-economic situation in Yemen 

Introduction: The socio-economic situation in Yemen
There are different kinds of drivers and causes of conflict. In this chapter of conflict analysis of the Yemeni conflict, we have a look at the socio-economic situation in Yemen, guided by the theories of causes for civil war.
The Oxford English Dictionary defines “socio-economic” as being the factor or driver “that derives from or is concerned with interaction of social and economic factors” [1]. So, the question we are asking is: to which extent is the Yemeni conflict - as we know it today - caused or driven by the current socio-economic situation. It is crucial for understanding the Yemeni conflict that at the beginning of the protests in 2011, the protesters demanded political change [2]. Marie-Louise Clausen states that the “absent of political and economic development” in Yemen is a root cause of the civil war [3]. The conflict has internal roots and is better understood as an internal struggle about who controls the state [4]. In general, one could say that the protesters were expressing their desire for a new social contract built on the rule of law, political accountability, and good governance [5].

Keywords: economic grievances, opportunity costs, economic inclusion, state capability, patronage

Analysis

Multiple theories regarding the causes of civil war mention socio-economic factors as possible causes of civil war. We can divide those who are applicable on Yemen in five factors:

1. Opportunity for private gain
2. Horizontal inequality
3. Geographic distance
4. History
5. State capability

All of these factors interact with, correlate and/or influence each other.

1. Opportunity for private gain 

Conflict and rebellion are opportunities for private gain which can be a motivation to participate [6]. When households can expect higher income by allocating their time and labour to rebellion and/ or soldiering, those households, foremost the men, are changing their occupation [7]. Most rebels are men, poor, have a low-level education and are facing unemployment. Those grievances are showing that they face low opportunity costs [8].
In Yemen, we can see that the Yemeni elites focus on increasing their own influence and control of the state to gain the access to resources, trying to change the balance of powe [9]. The internal political infighting and lack of political change is on the one hand a cause as well as a driver of the conflict [10]. These internal struggles as well as the following factors cause large spread poverty all over Yemen, resulting in lower opportunity costs for rebellion [11].

2. Horizontal inequality

Horizontal inequality, the inequality between different societal groups, enhances grievances and group cohesion among the relatively deprived and/ or marginalised [12]. That is a possible explanation for the Houthis’ success, since they are supported by popular frustrations over living circumstances and lack of political change within their community [13]. Their demand for economic and political change is a result of their economic and political marginalisation. By fighting the regime that is marginalising them, they are trying to put an end to this marginalisation [14]. According to Clausen, the Houthis built their popularity on the demand for the reintroduction of fuel subsidies and economic reforms. Even after the protests in 2011 and the creation of the transitional government, the Houthis and the Hirak, the Southern Movement, were not included in the transitional government [15].  

3. Geographic distance

As mentioned above the rebellious movements in Yemen often have a geographical component, Hirak is the Southern Movement and the Houthis are largely from northern Yemen. Theoretically speaking, we can see a “Principal-agent issue” in Yemen. This issue says that supervision of rule and law enforcement is complicated the greater the geographic or social distance [16].
Judging by Marie Louise Clausen, the Houthis, religiously mostly Zaydis, lived on the “fringes of the state”. Sa’ada, the Houthis’ “original region” borders Saudi Arabia and has limited access to state resources [17]. Their poor infrastructure, social welfare, education, and security are a reason for their population to rebel against the state. The Houthis strengthened their support within the population by providing services as water, electricity, little education and health care [18]. Historically speaking, the Yemeni state was never able to extend its control, enforce the rules and the monopoly of violence beyond urban centres, this is caused by and a reason for traditional tribes playing a central role in provision of services. This shows the fragmented nature of the Yemeni state. There is limited statehood and territories where they do not provide services or control [19].

4. History 

Next to this historically fragmented statehood in Yemen we could say that Yemen is trapped in what theoretics call a “Conflict Trap”. It means that countries which have been experiencing internal, violent conflicts are more likely to experience another conflict because low income is a consequence of past conflicts as well as a cause for new ones [20]. These deep and longstanding differences between groups are prone to cause further conflicts [21].
In the case of Yemen, we can see that after the unification of Yemen in 1990, the Yemeni population faced a first violent conflict in 1994 because southern Yemen tried to secede. This secession caused a civil war in which the southern rebels were defeated by President Saleh’s army. After this civil war and the victory for President Saleh, Saleh centralised the power even more in the north and the capital Sana’a which meant that the south was and is still in decline [22].
But it is not as in the north, all people profited from this centralisation of power. The Houthis are originally from the historically underdeveloped region of Sa’ada and are thereby a marginalised group themselves within the Yemeni society. They as well experienced a first civil war against the Yemeni military between 2004 and 2010 after the death of Hussein Al-Houthi, the founder of the Houthi Movement. In this civil war, the presidential army was ruthless towards the civil society which caused even more grievances toward the regime centralised in Sana’a [23]. As well as the civil war experiences, the experience of economic crisis can be a cause for civil war. In Yemen, there was and is still an economic crisis before, during and after the protests in 2011 which were caused by different factors including by the low state capability [24].

5. State capability

According to Anke Hoeffler and other theoretics low state capability and low provision of public goods for excluded groups is one of the possible reasons why a country experiences internal violent conflict [25].
The low capability of the Yemeni state is due to variating reasons, one of the most important is the patronage network within the political elite. It is an informal, fluid web of power with the president at the centre. He placed mostly his relatives in important state related positions, chose influential personalities like General Ali Muhsin as the military leader and gave other important state positions to the male members of the Al Ahmar Clan which is conglomeration of the sheiks of most influential clans in Yemen [26]. Formal institutions, such as the parliament, were always less important than the personal network and tribal structures which include tribal elites, religious leaders, businesspeople, and technocrats. The social services are limited and mostly absent in rural areas like Sa’ada. Next to this, the population of regions far from the capital experience limited presence of police and a defunded legal system [27]. Since the central Yemeni state is not providing the population with public goods, tribes play a central role in provision of services as indigenous informal societal forces. That is why Yemenis rely on those local providers of security and social services. This shows that the Yemeni central state is a barely functioning state and actors that are providing basic services, for example a sense of security, like the Houthis, are supported by the population which results in political instability caused by lacking legitimacy at the state level [28].
This political instability is according to Hegre, Sambanis, and Hoeffler one of the reasons why states experience internal conflicts [29]. The Yemeni state’s weakness was exposed as the political transition from 2011 has not stabilised the political system [30]. The National Dialogue Conference (NDC) was supposed to be a national forum for addressing grievances and defining a new/ more inclusive Yemeni state, discussing the foundations of a new Yemeni constitution [31]. But the decision-making capabilities and access to resources remained in the hands of actors of the inner circles of President Saleh.
The state’s legitimacy is further undermined since the political elite lets external actors like the United States of America perform military actions on Yemeni ground. In the eyes of the political opposition in Yemen, this illustrates a loss of Yemeni sovereignty and shows a lack of internal capacity which reinforced Hadi’s internal weakness and undermines his legitimacy [32].
This tendency towards the low state capability was continously fuelled through military disintegration. The Yemeni army is described as a ‘tribalized army’ having no military professionalism. It is fragmented and not designed to display loyalty to state institutions which is causing internal violent fighting between even different parts of the military [33]. All of this plus the lack of infrastructure, functioning administration and a social security system is causing the Yemeni society to fight each other according to Glosemeyer [34].
 

Podcast about the causes of civil war: 

https://wb-ilias.uni-freiburg.de/goto.php?target=file_316820_download

Conclusion and Outlook

Concludingly we can say that there is a strong interaction of the five factors 1. Private gain, 2. Horizontal inequality, 3. Geographic distance, 4. History and 5. State Capability. They are all influenced by the existing patronage network which is in the majority tribe elites. The patronage network and its working is on the one hand caused by the state’s incapability to enforce the rule of law as well as to control the monopoly of violence, and on the other hand is causing the state’s capability to do so.
Furthermore, for the majority of Yemenis, the economic situation is bad. Only the elites have access to economic resources. This marginalisation of the majority of the population has been going on for a long time and is therefore a long term internal conflict. This points towards the notion that Yemen is trapped in a “Conflict Trap”.
Those horizontal inequalities between Yemenis are visible in the cleavages and other drivers of the Yemeni conflict. Within the North-South cleavage we can see that it interacts with socio-economic factors as the access to resources and the economic marginalisation of a large part of the Yemeni population play a significant role. The lack of infrastructure in rural areas which are far from the capital is deepening the socio-economic problems. In terms of possibilities of political participation or even representation, one has to say that it is difficult to gain power over state institutions. Therefore, we see a lack of political representation. There are inequalities regarding the access to power between societal political groups. As there is large spread poverty all over Yemen, we could say that the socio-economic factors with regards to the emphasised inequality is one of the root causes for the internal conflict in Yemen. However, scientifically speaking, there is little empirical evidence for inequality being the cause of this civil war.

To solve the Yemen conflict, one must solve the socio-economic problems. Yemenis should all have access to the same extent of infrastructure and provision of public goods. Next to this, one should start a process of reconciliation on all of the four levels of reconciliation as mentioned in the module “reconciliation”.
The following modules will take a close look onto how the cleavages religion, power and representation, gender and the North-South divide further excarberate the civil war in Yemen. Afterwards will be detailed the characteristics of conflict mediation and its effectiveness as well as the concepts, mechanisms and aims of transitional justice and reconciliation.

Link to the media article explaining that the Yemen conflict is an internal and not a sectarian one: 

https://www.ispionline.it/en/pubblicazione/yemen-sectarianization-political-conflict-19933