Religion

Introduction & Structure of the Module
This module provides you with relevant information to analyse the role of religion in the Yemeni conflict. First, it gives you some basic background information on religion in Yemen in general. Second, it discusses the role of religion as a conflict driver in order to, third, evaluate its implication for a potential peace process in Yemen. The module ends with an outlook and a conclusion arguing that, while religion is a relevant factor and deserves attention especially in the peace process, it should not be understood as the sole or most important conflict driver and is not to be seen as a primary root-cause of the conflict.

Keywords: Conflict Drivers, Zaydi/Sunni, Radicalisation, Peace, Religion

Religion in Yemen 
Yemen is a highly religious country with approximately 99% of its population being Muslims[1]. This large group is said to be split in two groups: Sunni-Islam and Zaydi Islam - the latter being a removed form of Shia Islam. According to the United States, 65% of the population identifies as Sunni-Muslims and 35% as Zaydi Muslims [2]. Most Sunnis within Yemen belong to the Shafi’i branch [3]. All other religions like Christians and Jews make up one percent of the population.

While Yemen is often considered a failed state, the existing constitution recognises religion as state religion and Sharia as the source of legislation [4]. The Saleh government officially condemns religious persecution, which is primarily done by Houthi followers, who have consisted largely of the Zaydi minority[5]. In 2020, there were reports of Houthis impairing religious places, endangering religious gatherings and practicing antisemitism and restrictions towards Jews[6]. Interestingly, the decisive moment in the development of the conflict between the Saleh government and the Houthis is believed to be a shouting of the jihadist slogan ““God is great! Death to America! Death to Israel! Curse upon the Jews! Victory to Islam!” during a visit of president Saleh to a mosque in Sana’a[7]. 

Religion as a Conflict Driver 
Given the religious language used by conflict parties, sectarianism is often portrayed as a main driver of the conflict in Yemen. Specifically, the conflict has been seen as a clash between the Sunni and Shia branches of Islam. Under this narrative,the Houthi rebel group is seen as a Shia insurgent group, supported by the major Shia power Iran, and a Sunni Yemeni majority, backed by self-proclaimed leader of Sunni Islam, Saudi Arabia[8]. Yet, it appears to be generally agreed that, historically, there has been very little sectarian conflict in Yemen [9]. Additionally, it has been argued that the differences between different Islamic branches in Yemen are not big enough to ignite a war of the scale currently observed[10]. Particularly, the branch of Shia Islam followed by many Houthi members, Zaydism, is sometimes seen as beeing closer to Sunni Islam than the brand of Shia Islam practiced in Iran[11]. Moreover, Sunni Muslims are also part of the Houthi movement and the movement is looking to make alliances outside of the lines of sectarianism [12]. Hence, the root causes of their rebellion are seen to be political as well as socio-economic rather than religious in nature [13].

Nonetheless, there are religious elements to the conflict in Yemen. Firstly, sectarianism has gained importance with the regionalisation of the conflict, as a tool to mobilise support and quell critics. Especially Saudi Arabia and the government of the Republic of Yemen (GORPY) have attempted to portray the Houthis as a terrorist sectarian group, en-par with Al-Qaeda on the Arab Peninsula (AQAP), in cahoots with Hezbollah in Lebanon, and pawns of Iran [14]. By the analysis of the US-embassy in Yemen, these claims were also made to convince the United States government to classify the Houthis as a terrorist organisation [15].  In the shadow of the U.S. “war on terror” and Saudi Arabia’s regional rivalry with Iran, this narrative can have significant mobilising appeal, both for Iranian support for the Houthis, and Western support for the Saudis. 

Secondly, one of the most feared actors in Yemen from a Western perspective is AQAP. While AQAP is an Islamist group, their strategy and actions have often been seen as relatively pragmatic, trying, for example, to exploit local grievances against Houthis and government rather than religious sentiment [16]. As a conflict driver, AQAP’s increased presence is seen as a symptom of a power-vacuum in the state [17], rather than a deep expression of Yemeni religious conflict. 

Implications for the Peace Process
Even though religion might not be the cause or the main driver of the Yemeni conflict, it’s implication for a peace process is, nevertheless, extensive:

First, the involved parties of the conflict do use religion as a form of polarisation and advocacy for their cause. Moreover, religious places have been destroyed and people have been attacked in the name of religion, which will be relevant for any transitional justice and reconciliation process in a post-conflict society. Nevertheless, the existing religious similarities and tradition of intra-islamic coexistence in Yemen could be used as a reconciling force through a change in the narrative.

Second, Iran and Saudi Arabia clearly subscribe to their different branches of Islam and see themselves as protector of the respective branch. These actors use this polarisation for their political power-struggles. As they currently play an important role in the conflict, their opinions and religious beliefs as well as religious cleavages will be relevant for the peace process. Hence, religious leaders play an important role for negotiating a peace agreement.

Third, the narrative of the conflict between the factions in Yemen being religious persists on the level of international politics and media coverage, which - with the UN involved - eventually have an impact on the settlement of the conflict. This narrative also impacts who got involved in the conflict and for what reasons, for example, in the case of the United States, to fight a real or perceived Islamic Terrorist threat.

Finally, the marginalisation of all religions other than Islam highlight the importance of a state-building process that includes a constitutional reform including religious freedom.

Outlook and Conclusion 
To conclude, this module looked at religion in Yemen, both on its own and as a factor in conflict. It argued that religion should not be seen as the sole, or even most important source or driver of the war. At the same time, through its instrumentalisation, the adoption of religious language, and being embedded in regional and global narratives of religious conflict, the myth of religion as a conflict driver has real implications in Yemen, which must be addressed in the peace process. 

Religion is certainly overemphasised as a driver in the Yemen conflict. The two previous modules already highlighted the rural-urban divide and socio-economic factors, keep reading to learn about the impact of power and representation as well as gendered dynamics of the conflict. 

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